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After he took over as General Secretary of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) and as Chairman of 
the Central Military Commission in November 2012, Xi Jinping articulated for the first time ‘the 
China dream’ at ‘the road to revival’ exhibition at the National Museum in Beijing. As he did so he 
stressed that since the start of the reform period China had finally found the way to restore the 
greatness of the country and it was called ‘socialism with Chinese characteristics’.1 What Xi has 
revealed is not a new political system or even a new term to describe it. It is a confidence in the 
existing political system which, despite all its faults, he now believes is sufficiently strong, effective 
and robust to deliver the national revival encapsulated in his ‘China dream’. The nature of the 
system that Xi loosely refers to, in line with the long-standing usage after the end of the Mao 
Zedong era, as ‘socialism with Chinese characteristics’ gets clearer if it is set within the analytical 
framework of consultative Leninism.  
The use of this term in scholarly writings was first made by Richard Baum in a paper 
released by the French Centre for International Studies and Research or CERI in 2007.
2
 It was 
developed independently and fully into an analytical framework for understanding the nature of the 
political system in place in the People’s Republic of China (PRC) in an article I published in the 
Journal of Contemporary China in 2009.
3
 This paper incorporates parts of the previous article, 
particularly the definition of consultative Leninism. It shows that the approach Xi has adopted fits 
in with this analytical framework even better than the one he has inherited. The China that Xi has 
taken over from Hu Jintao is not a superpower that can challenge the United States of America as an 
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equal – at least not yet. But it stands tall as a rapidly rising power that commands attention globally 
and attracts admiration particularly from the developing world. In contrast to the early 1990s when 
the CCP leadership was worried that China might follow in the footsteps of other former 
Communist states and collapse, Xi exudes immense confidence in China’s political system and its 
prospects.  
 Xi’s China has come a long way from the earlier post-Mao experiments that sought to devise 
a not clearly defined development model for a political system distinctly different from liberal 
democracy. The original post-Mao approach of ‘crossing the river by feeling for rocks under the 
surface’ has now been replaced by a distinctly identifiable system. The most revealing way to 
describe this system is the analytical framework of consultative Leninism. This system had taken 
shape by the time Deng Xiaoping died in 1997 as Jiang Zemin asserted his authority fully as the 
core of the third generation leaders.  
Since then it has stood the tests of two orderly successions, in 2002 and 2012, as well as a 
major potential crisis as the global financial crisis of 2007–9 threatened to engulf China as well. It 
is a system that reaffirms the basic Leninist nature of the political system as it greatly strengthens its 
capacity to respond to public demands and shape public opinions, as it builds up a strong sense of 
national pride. While this involves introducing considerable changes in the political arena, this 
system is meant to enable the CCP to reject democracy as a model for China. ‘Chinese democracy’ 
as interpreted and implemented under the Party does not tolerate any scope for it to lose power.  
 This consultative Leninist system blends together the Leninist instrument of control with 
innovations from other sources. It has five defining characteristics: 
1. The Communist Party is obsessively focused on staying in power, for which maintaining 
stability in the country and pre-emptively eliminating threats to its political supremacy are 
deemed essential. 
2. A focus on governance reform both within the Party and in the state apparatus in order to 
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pre-empt public demands for democratization. 
3. A commitment to enhance the Party’s capacity to elicit, respond to and direct changing 
public opinion. 
4. A commitment to sustain rapid growth and economic development by whatever means and, 
where the party leadership deems politically expedient, regardless of its previous ideological 
commitment to Communism. 
5. The promotion of a brand of nationalism that integrates a sense of national pride in a tightly 
guided narrative of China’s history and its civilization with the greatness of the People’s 
Republic under the leadership of the Party. 
This chapter will discuss each of these characteristics in turn.  
 
Perpetuation of Party rule 
After the CCP used military power to crackdown and suppress challenges to its authority in 1989, it 
has become clear that Communism is no longer the ultimate goal for development despite the 
official rhetoric. Indeed, as Communist states in Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union collapsed one 
after the other in the following few years the relevance of Communism as the state ideology faded 
in China. Notwithstanding this historic change in terms of global history, the CCP has kept its 
Leninist structure, ethos and organizational principles and remains totally dedicated to staying in 
power. It keeps its anti-democratic nature and continues to exercise control over the state 
institutions. The only basic compromise it has made to the Leninist principles was to put aside, not 
formally give up, the ultimate objective of reaching Communism. 
The Party’s formal commitment to and its assertion that it already practises ‘democracy’ 
needs to be put in context. Socialist ‘democracy’ in place in China requires electoral outcomes to be 
predictable and to deliver general results approved by the Party beforehand. The chief mechanism 
the Party relies on to secure this is the principle of democratic centralism, which governs ‘intra-
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party democracy’. In the wider context, this mechanism is reinforced by its Maoist variant known as 
‘from the masses and to the masses’. In essence this means the Party must go to the masses or 
‘patriotic citizens’ to collect and collate ideas from them, then organize and otherwise add new 
input to produce a coherent and constructive set of policies and then take them back to the masses, 
educate and otherwise induce the masses to embrace such ideas as their own.
4
 As far as the Party is 
concerned its leadership ‘is a fundamental guarantee for the Chinese people to be masters in 
managing the affairs of their own country’.5 When the Communist Party refers to ‘democracy’ this 
is generally the meaning it has in mind.  
Indeed, the leading role and position of the Party continues to be enshrined in the 
Constitution of the People’s Republic of China (PRC) as the basic principle that underpins the 
political system.
6
 This is the only one of the ‘four cardinal principles’ that Deng Xiaoping put forth 
at the start of the reform period, and the only provision in the state constitution, that is strictly 
upheld.
7
 The CCP remains the ‘vanguard party’ and ‘guardian of the people’. As such it not only 
maintains its long-standing repressive capacities but also devises and implements a development 
model that seeks to deliver growth, employment, stability, order, prosperity and improved 
governance for the ordinary people.  
Under Jiang Zemin this approach was described in terms of ‘the Three Represents’, a 
concept articulated in July 2001. Jiang proclaimed that ‘The whole Party must always maintain the 
spirit of advancing with the times and constantly extend Marxist theory into new realms … give top 
priority to development in governing and invigorating the country and constantly break new ground 
and open up a new prospect in the modernization drive… [and] improve its Party building in a spirit 
of reform and constantly inject new vitality into itself’.8 Jiang did not spell out clearly his 
formulation except the fundamental importance of upholding the leading role of the Party with a 
new requirement. It was to broaden the basis of the Party from an alliance of workers and peasants 
to include the culturally advanced and economically vibrant elements of society. The private space 
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in which individuals could seek work or personal fulfilment without engaging in activities the Party 
deemed threatening to its supremacy was enlarged.  
After Hu Jintao succeeded Jiang this formulation was replaced by a policy of promoting a 
socialist harmonious society. In Hu’s words ‘a harmonious society should feature democracy, the 
rule of law, equity, justice, sincerity, amity and vitality’ in order to produce ‘lasting stability and 
unity’.9 What happened in reality was more complex. While the general trend in enlarging the 
private space for individuals to engage in many different kinds of activities was sustained, the Party 
also enhanced its capacity to identify those who might pose a challenge to its monopoly of power, 
and to eliminate such potential threats as soon as they were detected. 
As Xi takes the reins of power, Hu’s formulation no longer gets wide publicity. But the same 
basic ideas are incorporated and encapsulated in the ‘China dream’ that Xi regularly reiterates. 
Whether it is put in the language of Xi, Hu or Jiang, the fundamental principle has remained 
essentially the same. It is for the Party to adapt in order to improve its capacity to stay in power. 
This is to be achieved, when the general conditions in the country are benign, by the Party 
dominated government machinery delivering improvements in governance, reaching out to the 
general public, redressing public grievances and improving living conditions. In the leadership 
change year of 2012, there were strong pent-up public discontents over the scale and reach of 
corruption which caught the public imagination as the powerful leader of Chongqing Bo Xilai was 
removed from office.
10
 Hence, Xi promptly appointed Wang Qishan, widely seen as the member of 
the new Politburo Standing Committee least prone to corruption, to spearhead an anti-corruption 
drive, after he succeeded Hu.
11
   
As a political system consultative Leninism seeks to pre-empt popular demand for liberal 
democracy or constitutionalism.
12
 It dedicates itself to sustaining a benevolent and efficient one-
party system that practises democratic centralism. In so doing the Party retains its Leninist character 
and structure. This implies maintaining the capacity and the political will to use whatever means it 
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deems necessary to stay in power should this policy fail to achieve its desired result and the Party’s 
political supremacy is challenged. Consultative Leninism prefers to use smart or well-focused 
repression and, where practicable, inducements adroitly to eliminate or neutralize challenges to the 
Party as soon as such challenges are detected in order to pre-empt or reduce the need to resort to 
dramatic large-scale or summary repression. 
 
Enhancing governance  
Consultative Leninism promotes ‘good governance with Chinese characteristics’. What this means 
needs to be contextualized carefully. The ‘Chineseness’ in this formulation should not be confused 
with traditional Chinese culture or genuine Confucian values. The traditional Chinese concept of 
‘the ideal government … is one which is efficient, fair, honest and paternalistic, yet non-intrusive 
vis-à-vis the life of the ordinary people’.13 This contradicts the basic nature of the CCP as a Leninist 
institution, which is about proactively leading, directing and mobilizing the general population to 
support all aspects of development as the Party sees fit.  
In defining good governance with Chinese characteristics the Party looks back into both its 
own relatively short history and China’s long history for inspiration. It also examines ideas and 
experience from outside of China as it constructs an alternative model to democratization that is 
suited to the ‘special conditions of China’. As Xi Jinping explained, ‘with regard to our cultural 
tradition and those from outside the country, we must make the old serve the present and those 
originating in the West useful for China’ today.14 Leninism, a Russian import, is therefore no less 
Chinese for this purpose than, say, Confucianism.  
A particularly important set of lessons the Party has learned are the causes that led to the 
collapse of Communism in the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe.
15
 Xi felt that the most important 
point about the fall of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU) was that ‘nobody was man 
enough to stand up and resist’ Mikhail Gorbachev.16 This reinforces the moral the Party took from 
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the Beijing protests centred on Tiananmen Square in 1989 – that popular protests got out of hand as 
internal divisions at the top became public knowledge after the Party failed to act quickly and 
decisively when an unauthorized mass gathering was allowed to take place in the form a vigil 
commemorating the death of Hu Yaobang.
17
 Since he took over Xi has insisted on returning to 
traditional Leninist discipline to pre-empt the risk of the CCP following the fate of the CPSU.
18
 The 
Party has further examined the experience of the ‘Asian tiger economies’ under authoritarian rule, 
particularly that of Singapore.
19
 The final product is, however, what the Party chooses to put 
together regardless of origins, which it labels as a distinctly modern Chinese approach. 
 The chosen instrument to deliver good governance is the Party itself.
20
 It is an instrument 
that requires constant reform and updating. The Party seeks to do so by broadening ‘its membership 
base, promoting a new generation of leaders, reformulating its ideological content, appealing to 
nationalist impulses in society, strengthening its organizational apparatus throughout the country, 
and opening the channels of discourse within the party and between the party-state and society’.21 
Such an approach, which is reinforced by increasing institutionalization and merit-based promotion, 
has made its brand of authoritarianism resilient. 
 More specifically the Party has introduced reforms in the political arena aimed at enhancing 
its own capacity and that of the state to govern effectively. It should be emphasized that such 
reforms are not meant to be political changes in the direction of democratization but administrative 
and other changes intended to pre-empt the need for democratization.
22
 The Party uses ‘a mix of 
measures to shore up popular support, resolve local protests, and incorporate the beneficiaries of 
economic reform into the political system’.23 Reforms, including anti-corruption drives, are deemed 
necessary to enhance positively its governance capacity and its assertion of legitimacy. At the same 
time the Party also ‘forcefully represses efforts to challenge its authority and monopoly on political 
power and organization’.24  
 Since Hu Jintao succeeded Jiang Zemin the Party has paid more attention to the general 
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population as a means to enhance the governance capacity of the Party. It does so by selectively 
putting into practice some Maoist ideas or practices. They include, for example, reviving the 
principle of democratic centralism,
25
 as well as making a public commitment to redress the neglect 
and abuse faced by the rural population, who had been left behind in the rush towards fastest 
possible growth under Jiang.  
This suggests a stronger recognition that the Party must deliver social justice in order to pre-
empt discontent in the countryside from developing into a major source of instability.
26
 Hu publicly 
advocates that the government should ‘provide improved public services for the country's 
citizens’.27 He takes the view that ‘the biggest danger to the Party … has been losing touch with the 
masses’ and the Party leadership must therefore ‘focus on the core issue of the inextricable link 
between the Party and the masses’.28 This basic approach seems to have been followed by Xi. Even 
though it is doubtful if Xi’s anti-corruption drive will in fact end systemic corruption, it goes a 
significant way in appeasing the general public. The ostentatious display of ill-gotten gains or lavish 
entertainment by officials at public expense has dramatically been reduced after Xi rose to the top.
29
 
The approach adopted by Xi and Hu reflects awareness of how effective some of the Maoist 
mobilization and propaganda methods are, and a preparedness to revive some of them. 
 
Increasing institutionalization and merit-based promotion 
Consultative Leninism relies on institutionalization to make Chinese politics less volatile. The most 
important achievement in this regard is the introduction of an institutionalized way to manage the 
generational succession. When Jiang’s ‘third generation’ leadership handed over to Hu’s ‘fourth 
generation’ leaders in 2002–3 it was the first time that an heir-apparent successfully took over as 
planned. This is a significant landmark as all previously anointed successors, from Liu Shaoqi to 
Zhao Ziyang, ended their careers in dramatic and in most cases tragic circumstances. Hu’s relatively 
uneventful succession to Jiang was meant to set a precedent.  
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This practice was followed and strengthened in November 2012 as Hu handed over to Xi in 
the 18th Party Congress. On this occasion, Hu passed on both the offices of General Secretary of 
the Party and Chair of the Central Military Commission to Xi and formally retired. In contrast, his 
predecessor Jiang hung on to the latter position for two years after relinquishing the Party 
leadership in 2002. 2012 was also the first time in the history of the PRC when the new Party 
Chairman and Premier emerged from a compromise reached by the top leadership in the previous 
Party Congress five years previously, and was not the result of having been anointed by a strong 
man. Even by the standards of the post-Mao era this is another landmark development, as Deng 
Xiaoping had in fact anointed three direct and one indirect successor. Among the direct ones, Hu 
Yaobang, Zhao Ziyang and Jiang Zemin, only the last completed his term of office without being 
removed by fiat. The indirect successor was Hu Jintao himself. 
Despite all the drama and rumours that appeared in the media ahead of the 18th Party 
Congress (2012) and the intensity of tough bargaining and horse-trading behind the scenes, the 
politics of succession has become sufficiently institutionalized that it is now nearly predictable, at 
least for the headship of the Party and of the State Council. The old practice of the paramount leader 
anointing a successor has now been replaced by a new one, which is still at the early stage of being 
institutionalized. It involves the existing top leadership collectively choosing their key successors 
and placing them in apprenticeship for five years before ascending to the top offices, as General 
Secretary of the Party and Premier of the state. The handing over of power may not be democratic 
but it is becoming structured, stable and basically predictable – indeed, much more predictable than 
possible in a genuine democratic system. As a political system consultative Leninism supports 
collective leadership with an identifiable top leader but limits (though it cannot eliminate) the scope 
for the rise of a strong man. 
 Greater institutionalization also means the increasing importance of enforcing the law and 
containing corruption. In sharp contrast to the Maoist era when the law was reduced to irrelevance, 
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the Party has resorted to rule by law.
30
 Whereas the judicial system was a shambles just over three 
decades ago, China now has roughly 200,000 judges, 160,000 prosecutors and 150,000 registered 
lawyers at work to improve the quality of justice administered. Although the Party and its top 
leadership remain above the law and there is no indication that they are individually or collectively 
willing to subject themselves to the law, it does occasionally allow one of their own to face the 
force of the law as guided by the Party where it is in the interest of the current top leadership for 
this to happen, as was the case in the trial of Bo Xilai.  
What is being put in place is not the rule of law, essential for democracy to function 
properly and flourish, but rule by law. It means that in cases with no political implications, the law 
is increasingly being upheld and the Communist Party seeks to govern through the enforcement of 
the law rather than in spite of the law.
31
 Under consultative Leninism, the Party retains leadership 
over the judiciary. The improvements in the criminal justice system have meant substantial 
reduction in cases of human rights abuse even though political activists and dissidents are treated no 
less harshly than under Deng, as reflected in the cases of, say, the Nobel peace prize winner Liu 
Xiaobo and dissident artist Ai Weiwei. Indeed, the Chinese government required all lawyers ‘to 
swear an oath of loyalty to the “leadership of the Chinese Communist party” and the “holy mission 
of socialism with Chinese characteristics”’ in 2012.32 But substantial improvements had been made 
in the criminal justice system particularly during Xiao Yang’s tenure as President of the Supreme 
People’s Court (1998–2008). Xiao focused on improving training and standards of judicial 
personnel in order to reduce gross abuses that used to be endemic in the criminal justice system.
33
  
Although this did not eliminate or even significantly reduce political interference into the judicial 
system, its resultant improvement in the administration of justice in criminal cases was valuable in 
enhancing the credibility of the regime and thus the Party’s governance capacity. 
As far as corruption is concerned the Party recognizes the importance in tackling it. But the 
Party cannot stamp out systemic corruption as China lacks the necessary institutional checks and 
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balances against corruption as well as the rule of law. Unchecked power corrupts. Nevertheless, 
despite considerable public scepticism, the Party has managed to limit the damage corruption does 
to its legitimacy.
34
 It does so by launching periodic high profile attempts to contain the ills of 
corruption and by requiring the media to report known cases as failings of specific officials and not 
of the Party or of the central government. The Party’s efforts to contain corruption are also needed 
to limit the erosion of its capacity to exert party discipline as required under Leninism albeit of the 
consultative variant. 
The ascendance of the younger generations of leaders has brought about another major 
change from the past, when the top positions were held almost exclusively by revolutionary 
veterans. This generational change meant that technocrats had replaced the revolutionary cadres 
holding all the top offices by the time Jiang became the genuine core of the third generation 
leadership in 1997 or when consultative Leninism took shape. The technocrats have a different 
outlook from the ‘old revolutionaries’.35 They recognize that none of them can really take over 
Deng Xiaoping’s mantle as the paramount leader.36 They cannot justify their hold on power by their 
revolutionary pedigree as founders of the PRC or veterans of ‘the revolutionary war’ or of the Long 
March. Instead they must do so by demonstrating their competence and political skills in keeping 
others in line. 
This has led to a greater acceptance of proven ability or record. Since the legitimacy of the 
Party’s rule after 1989 has been based in part on a de facto social contract that the people will 
acquiesce in the continuation of its monopoly of power as long as it delivers continuous 
improvements in living conditions, improving the governing capacity of the Party is vital. The other 
element that sustains this de facto social contract, namely that the Party’s political dominance 
should not be challenged as it has the will and the means to use force to suppress any such attempt, 
also requires a strengthening of the administrative capacity of the Party. With the technocrats 
lacking the standing Deng Xiaoping enjoyed in the armed forces that enabled him to deploy the 
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army to stage the crackdown in June 1989 despite the initial public articulation of reservation within 
the military establishment, their rise to power provides a strong incentive to pre-empt a crisis that 
will necessitate a similar military crackdown. Since the technocrats cannot count on the military to 
repress popular unrests in the way that Deng could, they have less scope to ignore public opinions.  
 This means that consultative Leninism sought to enhance governance capacity by recruiting 
and promoting on merit.
37
 The Party’s objective is to secure a ‘high quality contingent of Party 
leaders that are competent for ruling the country and handling state affairs’.38 This does not spell the 
end of privileges or relevance of family background. The so called Princelings ‘faction’ – or, the 
grouping of senior cadres who are descendants of leaders of the revolution – has flourished and 
clearly benefited from this new emphasis. How should this apparent contradiction be explained? 
It is because merit in the consultative Leninist system requires one to have political 
astuteness and a capacity to network effectively in the establishment in order to deliver results. 
Princelings have privileged upbringings, career backgrounds and family connections that enable 
them to build up the necessary technical competence, personal network and political skills to 
operate successfully within the Party. This puts them in good positions to gain promotion on the 
basis of merit or achievement. The elevation at the 17th Party Congress (2007) of Xi Jinping to 
become the unofficial heir apparent to Hu Jintao illustrates this in action. The promotion of Xi, a 
‘princeling’, despite Hu’s personal preference for anointing ‘non-princeling’ Li Keqiang, has widely 
been attributed to two factors. These are the economic success of two coastal provinces where Xi 
served as Party secretary and wide acceptance of him within the Party establishment.
39
 The latter 
quality also counts as a ‘merit’ as the capacity to garner support or at least neutralize opposition 
within the establishment is an important requirement to function effectively in consultative 
Leninism. By adopting a system that enables the more able administrators and political operators to 
rise more quickly, the Party ensures that its upper echelons are filled by individuals who are able to 
work effectively within the existing political system. 
23 
 
Strengthening consultative capacity 
While consultative Leninism is meant to pre-empt democratization, ironically its adoption also 
involves the introduction of some changes that are commonly seen in democratization. They 
include not only expanding good governance practices but also allowing for a greater scope for civil 
liberties and for political participation. In terms of greater political participation the most important 
general elections in China are not those for the National People’s Congress but for the Communist 
Party’s national congress. At the 17th Party Congress, held in October 2007, the party leadership 
allowed 15 per cent of nominees to fail to get elected.
40
 At the 18th Party Congress of November 
2012, 9.3 per cent of those nominated for Central Committee membership were required to accept 
‘electoral’ defeat, whereas the percentage was set at the higher figure of 11.3 per cent for those 
nominated as alternate members of the Central Committee.
41
 The Chinese government has also 
experimented with township level elections since the turn of the century on the basis of 
experimentation with village level elections introduced since the 1980s.
42
 Admittedly such 
developments do not amount to genuine democratic exercises as the Party can and generally does 
secure its desired electoral outcomes, but they do enlarge the scope for election.
43
    
 The Party has also made a point of consulting more external individuals and organizations 
than before. Important gestures underlining the Party and the government’s commitment to do so 
range from reaffirming the right of existing consultative institutions to criticize specific government 
policies to the use of the new media as an opinion forum, to allowing greater scope for civil society 
to operate.
44
 Indeed, the Party revived the Chinese People’s Consultative Political Conference 
(CPPCC) as an institution of consultation. Non-Communist parties that are represented at the 
CPPCC are now encouraged to articulate their views and ‘discuss directly with the central 
government leaders’.45 Non-Communist individuals of considerable personal achievement have also 
been co-opted to join the central government. Wan Gang was appointed Minister of Science and 
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Technology in 2007. Chen Zhu also served as Minister of Health from 2007 to 2013. Although such 
appointments represent primarily the application of a classic United Front idea to ‘show the trust of 
the CPC Central Committee in people from outside the Party’, it was a significant step in 
strengthening the non-exclusive element of consultative Leninism.
46
 
As to the Internet, which can be an important instrument for undermining authoritarian 
regimes, the Chinese authorities not only monitor and control it vigorously but also adopt it as an 
instrument for consultation. Starting in 2007 the State Council has committed itself experimentally 
to using its official website to collect opinions on draft laws and regulations. Even top leaders like 
to project the image that they can be accessible via the Internet. When he was Premier, Wen Jiabao 
maintained a presence on Facebook.
47
  As General Secretary of the Party Hu Jintao held online 
discussions in the Renmin Ribao’s ‘strong country forum’ in 2008.48  
 The swift and effectively choreographed responses to the catastrophic Sichuan earthquake of 
May 2008 suggest the top leadership had realized the importance of seizing the moment to 
strengthen the state and the Party’s capacity to reach out to the general population and win over 
their support. In so doing it demonstrated consultative Leninism working in its most effective way.  
By dispatching Premier Wen Jiabao to the disaster scene while Hu retained supreme control 
in Beijing, the Party projected the image that it cared and the top leadership worked closely 
together. Wooden in public events, Hu could not have projected the right image for the Party had he 
gone instead of Wen. Wen’s public performance focused public attention on the efforts being led by 
the top leadership and directed media coverage to showcase the rescue efforts rather than the 
suffering of the victims.
49
 It distracted attention, even of the international media, from raising 
obvious questions about China’s less than perfect rescue operation. The Chinese government’s 
decision not to permit foreign rescue teams to enter Sichuan immediately after the scale of the 
earthquake was known meant that irreplaceable time for rescuing victims from collapsed buildings 
was lost. In the end the first external or foreign rescue teams were allowed to reach the scene of the 
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earthquake on day four, when experience elsewhere established that by then relatively few survivors 
trapped under rubble could be pulled out alive. Whatever the government’s considerations were for 
such a decision, the adroit management of the public image of the rescue operations allowed the 
importance of this specific inhumane decision to go largely unnoticed. 
By seizing the moral high ground promptly and turning public reactions to the disaster into a 
nationalist response the Party made it possible to win wide praise and support from the country 
generally and to deflect the inevitable criticisms on specific failings in the rescue and relief 
operation. Where such criticisms could not be silenced, they were directed against the inadequate 
performance of lower level officials in Sichuan and thus avoided criticism being directed against 
the overall performance of the Party. This effective use of propaganda to shape public opinion helps 
to sustain its positive image and moral authority which, in turn, reinforces its governance capacity 
and legitimacy. In addition, by beaming images of ‘Grandpa Wen’ at the front of the disaster zone, 
the Party reached out to the general public nationwide in a paternalistic way. Through its well-oiled 
propaganda machine it created a heroic image of Premier Wen and soldiers of the People’s 
Liberation Army saving victims of a natural disaster in the front line and under the overall 
leadership of the Party General Secretary. Thus, even in a situation where public opinions were 
being formed and changed quickly, the Party leadership seized the moment to control, shape and 
direct public opinion. This further enabled the Party to claim credit unobtrusively for galvanizing 
the country to respond proudly as a nation, once the outpouring of sympathy nationwide turned into 
self-organized non-government organization (NGO) based efforts to help the victims. For a short 
time NGOs were given space to help to deal with the aftermath of the earthquake but the non-local 
volunteers or NGOs were squeezed out after six months.
50
 With its moral authority affirmed, the 
Party was able to require NGOs to co-operate without appearing overly heavy-handed. 
 This shows an important improvement in governance capacity as the Party allowed a much 
larger scope than usual for NGOs to take civic action at a time of a major natural disaster. But it 
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also reveals the existence of a strategy for the Party to play a leadership role in directing the efforts 
of NGOs. The approach adopted is to treat civil society like a bird in a cage. The Party is prepared 
to enlarge the cage as it sees fit but a cage is nonetheless maintained. This is to ensure that civil 
society can have sufficient scope to operate in the non-critical realm while its ambition to extend its 
scope to the critical realm is contained so that the development of civil society cannot pose a threat 
to the continuation of Party rule. Indeed, consultative Leninism seeks to make NGOs help the Party 
efforts to move the country forward under its leadership. Since he came to power, Xi has reaffirmed 
or, indeed, reinforced this approach. 
 
Economic pragmatism 
Since the start of the reform period under Deng Xiaoping in 1978, pragmatism guided the 
management of China’s economy. But it took time for the old command economy to be transformed 
and for the mentality of policy-makers to adjust. The ‘bird cage approach’ for managing the 
economy, as explained by party elder Chen Yun, was clearly applied in the earlier half of the reform 
period. In this conception the economy was the bird and the scope for it to develop was the cage 
and the Party was willing to enlarge the cage as long as the performance of the bird justified it, but 
the Party could and did reduce the cage when required.  
By the time Deng died, in 1997, transformation from the old command economy had 
basically been completed. With the economy substantially modernized, much new infrastructure 
already built, a generation educated in modern management and other skills required to service a 
modern economy, the Party leadership increasingly allowed greater scope for the economy to 
develop, particularly after the potential contagion effect of the Asian Financial Crisis passed. In the 
last decade major debates among economic and financial policy-makers are no longer about 
whether the economy should be primarily a socialist or a market one but about what would be the 
most effective policy to secure sustained and sustainable rapid growth.  
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 Indeed, China’s economy is neither a free market nor a command economy. It is a mixed 
one where private capital now has huge scope to invest in almost whatever it deems the most 
profitable lines of manufacturing, trade or service provision. It is also one where state or publicly 
owned enterprises enjoy great privileges and government patronage, and are still subject to 
government direction. In a nutshell the Party leadership has enlarged the bird cage so much that the 
bird largely developed without finding itself seriously constrained by the cage most of the time. But 
pragmatism has its limits so far. The cage has not been removed.  
 As Xi, Premier Li Keqiang and the rest of the leadership work out a strategy to rebalance the 
Chinese economy in the coming decade, they will consult China’s best economists in think tanks 
and in academia as well as corporate leaders, and engage in dialogues with major foreign 
governments and corporate partners, but the Leninist nature of the regime will also assert itself. As 
far as the Party is concerned, it consults not because of recognition of the intrinsic value of 
consultation but because it sees consultation as useful in enabling the Leninist system to retain 
control and come out of an impending crisis stronger. There is no question that the Party retains the 
final say on what to do.  
 To rebalance the economy essentially means that it needs to make the Chinese economy less 
dependent on rapid growth driven by export and heavy investments, particularly in big 
infrastructural projects, and more dependent on domestic consumption. Indeed, Premier Wen Jiabao 
acknowledged this in 2007 and what is required today remains essentially the same, namely:  
i. widening the social safety net and raising household incomes and, ultimately, consumption; 
ii. removing the distortions in relative prices – mainly in the exchange rate and input costs – to 
exploit real comparative advantages and make the model more sustainable;  
iii. reducing the government’s interference in the allocation of resources; and  





Such changes implicitly require the Party to relinquish some of the most powerful levers it holds 
over the economy and allow the market to function more effectively and empower ordinary citizens 
as consumers. It amounts to finding an alternative to the ‘bird cage’ approach which has served the 
Party well since 1978. The requirements are not unknown to the Party leadership but implementing 
them will still prove difficult, as giving up control on anything that can potentially undermine the 
Party’s political hegemony is anathema to consultative Leninism. Whether under Xi’s leadership, 
the consultative Leninist system will be able to do what Hu failed to deliver in this regard in the 
previous decade remains to be seen.  
 
Nationalism: the new state ideology 
The last defining feature of consultative Leninism is the promotion of nationalism as the new 
ideological force that binds the country together under the leadership of the Party. After 
Communism in effect ceased being the state ideology, the CCP had to put in place a new ideological 
framework. This was in part a reaction to the events in Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union as the 
Chinese establishment feared social and national disintegration following ‘the decline of the 
traditional ideology’.52 It was also because the Party intended to prevent Western values and beliefs 
from captivating Chinese citizens living in an ideological void.
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 In any event, the provision of an 
ideological binding force was needed to enable the Leninist system function effectively.  
The choice of nationalism as the new though informal state ideology is meant to enhance the 
Party’s capacity to stay in power on two mutually reinforcing ways. It is to provide a new 
ideological basis for legitimacy on one hand and to serve as a new rallying force to develop a 
national aspiration around the leadership of the Party on the other. After the cleavages created 
between the Party and the ordinary people by the Tiananmen Massacre, the top leaders found 
nationalism ‘the most reliable claim to the Chinese people’s loyalty and the only important value 
shared by the regime and its critics’.54 They thus ‘moved quickly to position themselves as the 
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defenders of China’s national pride’ and unity.55 Few Chinese citizens in fact know the history of 
their country well but they have all been indoctrinated in the greatness of China’s long civilization 
and unity, as well as the iniquity of the ‘century of humiliation’ when China suffered from Western 
imperialism after 1838.
56
 The historical narrative chosen is outwardly a ‘pan-Chinese’ one. But in 
reality it is a Han-centric view of the history of greater China, in which minorities like Tibetans and 
Uighurs are written into Chinese history as Mongolians and Manchurians have been incorporated. 
Any ethnic group thus ‘honoured’ by their inclusion into China’s history will be deemed traitorous 
should they try to assert their own national identity and separate historical narratives. The 
nationalism thus promoted is essentially xenophobic in nature, which encourages the Chinese 
people to identify with a rising China under the leadership of the Party in juxtaposition against the 
West that is portrayed as uncomfortable with China’s resurgence and historic unity.57  
 More specifically, the Party has launched an extensive propaganda and educational 
campaign to indoctrinate the people in patriotism. It is one that requires the citizens of the PRC to 
participate in affirming ‘the rightness and acceptability of the state, its values, policies and 
agencies’.58 The core of this campaign is to emphasize ‘how China’s unique national conditions 
make it unsuitable to adopt Western style liberal democracy’ and how China’s existing political 
system helps to ‘maintain political stability, a prerequisite for rapid economic development’.59 By 
‘[r]einforcing China’s national confidence and turning past humiliation and current weakness into a 
driving force for China’s modernization’ the Party has turned nationalism into ‘an effective 
instrument for enhancing [its] legitimacy’.60 The intention is to instil in the mind of the Chinese 
people a sense of pride in China and its development that is inseparable from the leadership of the 
Party or a strong feeling of ‘my government right or wrong’.  
 The success of this nationalist indoctrination campaign manifested itself dramatically in 
2008, the year the Communist Party had intended to launch the rebranded modern China on the 
occasion of the Beijing Olympics. The force of nationalism, however, could not be contained until 
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the Olympics as was originally planned. The nationalists asserted themselves internationally when 
the Olympic torch relay outside of China generated unfavourable foreign comments and reactions in 
April that year. The negative foreign reactions were directed immediately at the way the Chinese 
authorities organized the relay, which was heavily guarded by elite members of the People’s Armed 
Police dressed as torch attendants to protect the Chinese parade against pro-Tibetan demonstrators 
in Western cities.  
Chinese nationalists reacted angrily and strongly against those who demonstrated in foreign 
cities where the torch passed against specific Chinese government policies, most of which were 
focused on Tibet.
61
 They readily dismissed out of hand the fact that by sending elite police officers, 
who often told the local police how the torch should be guarded during the overseas relay, Chinese 
authorities were interfering in the domestic affairs of the host countries concerned. The large 
number of Chinese citizens who responded so nationalistically showed that they preferred to ‘side 
with the government when foreigners criticize it, believing that, no matter how corrupt [or 
misguided] the government is, foreigners have no right to make unwarranted remarks about China 
and its people’62 – a classic manifestation of ‘my country, right or wrong’. 
 The Party’s adoption of nationalism also dramatically enhanced its governance capacity in 
the aftermath of the Sichuan earthquake of May 2008. By adopting a nationalist approach to the 
rescue operation and holding back entry of foreign teams from reaching the scene, the Chinese 
government ensured that nearly all survivors were saved by Chinese rescue workers. The heroism 
of the rescue operations by the Chinese nation was used to galvanize a countrywide movement to 
rally around the Party’s leadership in the subsequent relief efforts, even though generous foreign aid 
and donations were readily accepted. Thus, however well or poorly the Party might have actually 
performed on the ground, and whether bureaucratic corruption and other policy failures were 
responsible for the collapse of a disproportionately large number of school buildings, the Party still 
emerged from it stronger than before. Just as the astute management of propaganda after the 
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earthquake ensured a positive image of the Party being projected, the long-standing indoctrination 
of nationalism produced a people ‘willing to dissociate their leaders in Beijing from the local 
officials they blame’.63  
The Chinese government might have failed to silence all grieving parents but it could divert 
their anger from the central government to specific individuals or departments at the local level and 
reduce the negative impact on its own credibility.
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 Galvanizing the nation to focus on the ‘heroic’ 
rescue operations of the People’s Liberation Army apparently personally superintended by Premier 
Wen was the key to this success. 
All indications since Xi assumed leadership point towards even greater emphasis being put 
on nationalism. Within a month of his elevation, Xi explained to sailors in Guangzhou that the 
‘China dream’ was about national revival, and it was about both the building of a strong country 
and powerful armed forces that should be totally loyal to the Party.
65
 His invocation of national 
victimhood in China’s ‘century of humiliation’ provides the basis for foreign observers to see him 
as unashamedly appealing to emotion.
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 As elaborated in the Party’s theoretical journal, Qiushi, the 
‘China dream’ is about ‘merging the dreams of the individual with the dream of the country, of the 
nation, and of the people, and to put the interest of the individual, of the country, of the nation and 
of the people together as a whole’.67 This focus on national revival in Xi’s China dream suggests 
that he is at least as committed as, if not even more so than, his predecessor to use nationalism as 
the state ideology to galvanize the country in support of consultative Leninism. 
 
Conclusion 
As a leader Xi Jinping clearly intends to leave his mark. The launch of the ‘China dream’ 
propaganda line is designed to showcase his new approach, compared to that of his predecessor. But 
it is built solidly on the basis of the consultative Leninist political system already in place.  
Consultative Leninism has given China arguably as resilient a political system as it can have 
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without democracy. The resilience is rooted in the ruthless repressive capacity inherent in what 
remains an essentially Leninist political machinery. It is strengthened by incorporating various 
consultative elements and a new ideology that has much wider appeal than Communism. By 
modernizing the regime’s capabilities to monitor and direct public opinion and instil a sense of 
patriotic duty in its citizens to support the government, the Party has built up a significant capacity 
to deflect public discontent away from itself. By enhancing its ability to detect challenges as they 
emerge and remove most of them, either by co-optation or by smart (i.e., relatively well-focused) 
repression, before they become major threats to the system, consultative Leninism has lowered the 
need to resort to large-scale summary repression. This implies reduced exposure to risks that can 
destabilize or break the system in a fundamental way.  
Consultative Leninism is not a system that was specifically designed to replace the Maoist 
or Dengist political edifice. It evolved out of measures the Party took to confront and contain the 
challenges posed by the Tiananmen movement of 1989 and the subsequent collapse of Communism 
in Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union. The original impetus for change in the political arena was 
the Party’s concern over its own hold on power in China. Once this threat came to pass in the 
second half of the1990s and China found itself on track for very fast growth, the Party leadership 
gained in confidence. This new political setup demonstrated its resilience in the last few years. The 
Party’s self-confidence rose as China rode out the wave of instability and threats unleashed by the 
global financial crisis of 2008. As Xi took over in 2012, he articulated confidence in the system’s 
ability to sustain itself and form the foundation for China to secure its re-emergence as a great 
power of the first league. In this process, the Chinese establishment’s previous interest in the 
Singaporean approach as a possible model for China dissipated. This new-found confidence among 
Chinese leaders has been reinforced by the existence of China fever in the twenty-first century, as a 
world infatuated with China offers general recognition of and praise for its achievements. 
 Consultative Leninism is not a static system but one that continues to evolve, as inherent in 
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its requirements is the need for the Party to adapt to the changing environment in order to stay in 
power and direct China’s development. But its basic structure and governing dynamics have taken 
shape since 1997. The period since then has seen the incorporation of consultative elements to 
enhance what remains a basically Leninist institution and allow the CCP to react and respond to 
new challenges and to monitor and to direct public opinion.  Consultative Leninism uses whatever 
means at its disposal to maintain stability, order and economic growth, and it seeks to minimize the 
need to use harsh repressive measures on a large scale, but at the same time it keeps such capacity 
readily available for use. Indeed, a hallmark of consultative Leninism is the Party’s readiness to nip 
in the bud any challenge to the political supremacy of the Party as soon as such a challenge is 
detected. Confirmation of this took the form of the Party’s heavy-handed but effective response to 
the inter-ethnic riots in Urumqi (2009) or planned peaceful protests following the Jasmine 
Revolution of the Arab world (2011). To maintain this capacity the Party needs to collect and collate 
constantly the changing mood and opinions in the country at large. Indeed, doing so is essential for 
the Party to pre-empt nationalism from asserting itself so much that it may tie the hands of the Party 
leadership in dealing with a major great power such as the United States of America or Japan in 
some future and as yet undefined crisis.  
In general terms as consultative Leninism consolidates the Party gains in confidence and 
competence. As it does so it allows greater scope than previously for experimentation in finding 
ways to enable China to develop without moving towards democracy. Corporatist ideas are taken on 
board where they appear to work. A larger sphere is allowed for civil society to operate as long as 
the Party feels confident that it can keep NGOs in line when and where required. Reinvigoration of 
specific Maoist or highly modified Confucian ideas has also been adopted where the Party believes 
they can enhance its ability to govern or improve its moral authority. But the bottom line remains 
unchanged – the dominance of the Party, even if intra-party reforms, such as greater ‘inner party 
democracy’, may appear to make the top leader more responsive to others than his predecessors. 
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Indeed, the increased scope for debate among Party leaders is one of the means through which the 
Party enhances consultative Leninism and improves on its development model. 
 Resilient as it is, consultative Leninism suffers from a major inherent problem. It is that the 
Party needs to get its policies on the economy, politics and society right most of the time – a very 
tall order in the long term. The built-in safety valve to avoid a major policy or economic failure that 
may have significant negative impact on people’s living conditions that exists in a democracy – a 
change of government via the ballot box – does not exist in this model. Instead consultative 
Leninism relies on two main systemic ‘safety valves’. They are the application of nationalism and 
the bird cage approach to adjust the degree of control as required. The former raises the prospect 
that in order to divert public frustration and anger away from itself during a crisis the Party is likely 
to channel them against foreign powers or capitalists and blame them for turning a benign 
international environment into a hostile one for China. The latter implies that the Party will assert 
its Leninist nature at the expense of its consultative elements if the country should face a sustained 
crisis against which the Party appears helpless. Repression, tightening of control and manipulation 
of public opinion are the default options for ensuring regime survival when the Party feels it is 
under threat.  
How well consultative Leninism will fare in the very long term remains unknown, as the 
PRC has not faced any real crisis since 1992 after the aftershocks of the 1989 protests and the 
subsequent collapse of Communism in Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union. Its first big test 
happened as the global financial crisis unfolded. The Party responded to the economic slowdown by 
spending massively on infrastructure projects to rekindle short-term growth. But it resisted the 
much needed rebalancing of the economy to make its growth sustainable on a long-term basis. By 
transforming the political system into consultative Leninism, the Party has built the most powerful 
and resilient authoritarian system dedicated to keeping itself in power. As long as the central 
leadership stays united and determined to nip all challenges in the bud, it should be able to 
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perpetuate its hold on power. 
Consultative Leninism has now been adopted by Xi Jinping as the basis to build the ‘China 
dream’ as he defines it. While its capacity should not be underestimated, there is a question over 
how sustainable this will prove over the long term. Export-driven growth in China will slow down 
as the demographic surplus turns into a demographic deficit, the environmental degradation 
becomes intolerable, and the scope for using infrastructural investments to generate growth 
exhausted. To pre-empt such an eventuality, China will need to rebalance its economy and find an 
alternative model to secure sustainable growth and economic stability. This requires consultative 
Leninism to change fundamentally and move out of its comfort zone. Whether it can do so or not 
remains unknown. Should the eventuality outlined above materialize, whether the Party leadership 
would be able to hang together is an open question. Xi’s ‘China dream’ seeks to pre-empt such 
eventualities by making consultative Leninism more effective. Consultative Leninism may not last 
in the very long term, but it only needs to survive a decade for Xi to proclaim how much his ‘China 
dream’ has done for the country as he retires in a decade. 
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